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Features of Ukrainian mass media political discourse  
in the “post-Maidan” period
– What is democracy in Ukrainian? 
– It means voting until the real democrats are chosen.
(Anecdote from Segodnya newspaper, 18.01.2010)
Events related to the presidential elections of 2004 (known as the “Orange 
Revolution”, and in oppositional discourse as “the so-called Orange Revolu-
tion”, “orange Sabbath”, “orange coup”, for example), have changed the 
orientation of Ukraine's political development, and with it the discourses of 
politics and the mass media.
The live broadcast of “the revolution on Maidan”1 by the ‘5th TV Channel’ 
served as a release mechanism for new trends in the development of Ukrain-
ian society. These include unprecedented politicisation of all groups of society, 
the involvement of the general public in mass media political discourse, and 
recently in aspects of this such as internet communications.
The electoral processes that have been taking place in Ukraine since 2004 at 
both national and local levels (presidential, parliamentary, and local councils 
of deputies and mayors, in regular and pre-term elections), have significantly 
increased the role of the mass media in the life of Ukrainian society. Examples 
of this are the increased number of political talk shows on central TV channels 
which have high ratings and one or two repeats, and the active use of print 
media, online media and outdoor advertising by politicians and political scien-
tists during presidential campaigns. All this invites the assertion that the me-
diatization of living space in Ukrainian society after the events of 2004 has 
reached a critical point, and one of the models of mass media influence on a 
social level, the media addiction model (Kudryavtseva/Filatenko 2007, p. 331-
337) has been realised in Ukraine. This model is directly connected with in-
stability in social and political life. Under the conditions of the power crisis 
(2004-2010), Ukrainian citizens are more often turning to mass media as a 
1 Maidan – from Maidan Nezalezhnosti, ‘Independence Square’, the central square in Kyiv 
where the events of 2004 took place.
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source of not only information but also psychological comfort. And the media, 
in turn, have a unique opportunity to exercise influence over largely defence-
less citizens. Distinctive features of the Ukrainian mass media political dis-
course of the post-Maidan period are combative polemic and aggression, 
which have determined the overall direction of influence, including the selec-
tion of both verbal and nonverbal methods of expression. Modern Ukrainian 
political thinking in general is not characterised by tolerance. In the context of 
the narrative “Elections”, political language tends to be uncompromising, im-
placable and aggressive. Political intolerance of public officials (including na-
tional leaders), scandals, accusations of criminal pasts, betrayal of national 
interests, of separatism and illegal, anti-state activity have become part of 
everyday life, and can clearly be seen in the media content of the period 
2004-2010. 
We can observe these phenomena during the election campaign in Ukraine. 
The desire to discredit an opponent involves not only the attempted psycho-
logical impact on those individuals, the direct participants in the contest, but 
more importantly on the third parties, the listeners, viewers and readers, in 
order to impose their negative evaluations and to have a manipulative effect.
The existence of a system of pre-established values in Ukranian society allows 
the speaker or writer to convince their audience without argumentation, and 
also to have a large-scale manipulative effect on public consciousness, using 
mass media as a channel.
Investigation of Ukrainian media discourse shows that the participants in the 
narrative “Elections” widely use both positive and negative value judgements 
in their discursive practice. Moreover, positive value judgements of presiden-
tial candidates currently in power are mainly connected with allegations con-
cerning achievements in economic, political and social spheres, for example: 
“We have achieved great progress in economy [...] The economic growth rates 
were almost the biggest in Europe [...] [with a steep decline in European pro-
duction in this period, resulting from the economic crisis – L.K.] I am proud 
of this [...]” (Viktor Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine, presidential candi-
date, cited in Facty, 05.01.2010).
Positive value judgements made by presidential candidates from the opposi-
tion represent various achievements and benefits in the future, in case they 
win the elections: “I will make Ukraine a truly independent country [...] I will 
strengthen democracy [...] Ukraine will become a state for people” (Viktor 
Yanukovych, leader of the Party of Regions, presidential candidate, cited in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine, 05.01.2010).
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There is a wide range of variants among negative value judgements. Firstly, 
they represent accusations of incompetence in general, or ignorance of 
some professional issues in particular. Negative assessment of the oppo-
nent's mental abilities is also seen. Such accusations come not only from the 
opposition, as might have been expected (e.g.: “The current ruling regime is 
not capable of implementing reasonable fiscal reform during global financial 
crisis”, BLIC, 17.12.2008), but also from one element of the existing power 
structure to another: “The agreement signed by you [with Russia on gas sup-
plies – L.K.] – is a capitulation. You are mediocrities!” (the President address-
ing the Government, cited in Rabochaya Gazette, 07.-13.02.2009).
The most frequently used model of value judgements in modern Ukrainian 
media discourse is accusing opponents of excessive zeal for power. Judge-
ments of this type are used as an argument by all participants of the political 
narrative “Elections”: “Today you go over the corpses for the sake of your 
goal” (the President addressing the Prime Minister, “Rabochaya Gazette”, 
07.-13.02.2009), “I clearly see that you [the President of Ukraine – L.K.] now 
focus not on the problems of Ukraine but only consider how to stay in power. 
And you are ready to use even the global financial crisis to this end?” (ex-
President Leonid Kravchuk, www.unian.net, 24.02.2009); “[...] his [Leader of 
the Party of Regions – L.K.] words about the existence of an anti-crisis pro-
gram are perceived as another attempt to return to the lost power feeder ” 
(www.unian.net, 22.12.2008).
It should be noted that the value judgements, accusing the opponent of harm-
ing either the country, a particular region or the country's borders, are heard 
mostly in relation to each other from the representatives of one political force, 
which came to power after the “Orange Revolution”: “You brought Ukraine to 
default in 1997” (the Prime Minister addressing the President, Rabochaya 
Gazette, 07.-13.02.2009); “Timoshenko led to power people with criminal 
convictions, and her deputies are involved in the capture of other people's 
businesses and other illegal actions with land in the Kiev region” (President 
Yushenko, Segodnya, 24.12.2008).
We can also find examples of value judgements accusing opponents of not 
only the aggravation of confrontation and the collapse of the coalition (for 
example, Timoshenko said that Yushchenko's coalition had ‘fallen apart’ – 
BLIC 03.09.2008 ), but also of unfairness, dishonesty, and moral violation “At 
the end of the NSCU meeting [National Security Council of Ukraine – L.K.] 
the Interior Minister supposedly called up the Kyiv mayor and said that he 
was “just a liar and padlyuka”, but he got a kick on his knee” (www.unian.net, 
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25.01.2008); “It's a shock! Not so long ago in 2004 they tearfully embraced in 
Maidan, then quarrelled about scandal, made it up and now they fight and 
backheel again” (BLIC, 22.12.2008). These value judgements give evidence of 
the decay of a once united “orange” team, and relatedly, the destabilisation 
of the political situation in the country.
The Ukrainian mass media political discourse during the election campaign in 
2004 is characterised by irrational accusations of the type “They are – thugs”, 
“He/she is a thief.” In 2004 they came from the oppositional political forces, 
in the “postorange” period – mainly from “orange” forces who gained power 
(specifically government leaders and high ranking officials). Such assess-
ments are used as modes of address. This had not been observed previously, in 
all the previous years of Ukraine as an independent state. In the mass media 
we find these judgements in the form of direct or indirect quotations: “Thief 
and podkabluchniki!” (the President about the Prime Minister and her com-
panions, BLIC, 23.12.2008); “Yulia, you were regularly stealing that gas and 
now you are lecturing on how to get rid of corruption? You have a gift for 
theft, may God forgive me!” (the President addressing the Prime Minister, 
Rabochaya Gazette, 07.-13.02.2009); “I knew Pavel Lazarenko [ex-Prime 
Minister of Ukraine, a former business partner of the current Prime Minister 
and presidential candidate, Yulia Timoshenko. He is currently serving a prison 
sentence in the U.S. – L.K.] and Yulia Timoshenko, and spoke to them in per-
son. These are the thieves of the largest ‘class’, said Chernovetskiy, the mayor 
of Kiev” (www.unian.net, 09.02.2007).
The use of ideologically marked vocabulary in order to identify “our people” 
and “others”, forming mass consciousness archetypes of Good and Evil, is 
known to be one method of discursive influence. For example, in the discourse 
of “orange” parties we find this kind of vocabulary – holodomor, democracy, 
democratic coalition, European integration, European standards, Euro-Atlan-
tic integration (membership in NATO), pro-Ukrainian policy etc. In the dis-
course of political opponents we find phrases such as – friendship with Russia, 
European vector, social standards, federalization, the country's unification, 
single economic space (SES), the official status of the Russian language, local 
government reform, systemic reform and political stability.
An ideological function is also performed by verbal labels, which are markers 
of otherness and symbols of evil, and suggest a negative evaluation, forming 
an enemy image in public consciousness.
Labels in Ukrainian mass media discourse are used widely and variously. Dur-
ing the parliamentary election campaigns they relate mostly to the names of 
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political trends, parties, ideologies and social phenomena, as in: a) anti-Ukrai-
nian policy, Russian-Soviet party, “Kuchma's children”, the party of Donetsk 
bandits, “bandyuki of Donetsk”, “Dony” (the inhabitants of Donetsk), pro-
Moscow politicians, Kremlin's agents, the fifth column, the hand of Moscow/
Kremlin – on the one hand, and on the other hand b) banderovtsy, “nashisty” 
(representatives of the party “Our Ukraine”), natsiki, “orange”, “pomerantsy” 
(from the Ukrainian “помаранчевий”), pro-American policy/politicians, pro-
NATO policy/politicians/president, fascists, “maydanutye” (those who stood in 
Maidan in 2004, Yushchenko's supporters), galichansko-Chicago-camarilla 
(about the West-Ukrainian supporters of Yushchenko, the appeal to American 
citizenship and Yushchenko's wife's birthplace, Chicago), orange clan, orange 
putsch, yuschenizm. 
During presidential election campaigns the group of labels discrediting a po-
litical opponent by creating a negative image is updated. It may be insulting 
epithets, metaphors or names, or titles which describe a candidate for the pres-
idency and cause emotional and negative attitude towards them. Examples of 
this include (about Yanukovich): con, Bandyukovich, Prime Minister-hatter 
(a reference to his criminal record), proffesor (a reference to a questionnaire 
published in the media in 2004 and answered by Yanukovich); about Yush-
chenko: “three percent ” president, “kefirnyi ” rating of the president (refer-
ence to the 2.5-3% rating in opinion polls of 2009), “beekeeper” (referring to 
the President's hobby).
For the first time in the election campaign in Ukraine the highest state officials 
used gross and insulting labels, reflected in mass media discourse. Comment-
ing on the income declaration of Yulia Tymoshenko, the President addressed 
the Prime Minister as follows: “Bomzh! Where does the Prime Minister get 
hundreds of millions of hryvnia for advertising if she has no flat, no piece of 
land, no car?! Bomzh! Is it possible to live homeless for 50 years?” (Vlast 
Deneg No. 48, November 2009). The labels “Bomzh” and “Bomzhulya” (a blend 
of bomzh + Julya, by analogy with Tigryulya, from political advertising used 
by Yulia Timoshenko) and “Lady Bomzh” began to appear actively in print 
media and on the Internet.
Labels that express irony or sarcasm have become widespread in Ukrainian 
mass media political discourse. Some examples are: “kytsya” (Russian “ko-
shechka” ), “our kytsya”, “gas princess” (about Yulia Timoshenko, in the last 
example, a reference to her past management of a power engineering company 
and related to these criminal scandals in Ukraine, Russia and the United States), 
“Catherine Claire” (about Katerina Yushenko, the wife of the president, a U.S. 
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citizen of Ukrainian origin, used intensively in the 2004 presidential cam-
paign), “Messiah” (about Yushchenko), and “Rabbit Senya” (about Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk).
The appearance of labels may be explained by negative reaction to a politi-
cian's statements. Thus, the address “lyubi druzi” (favorite friends) in a public 
speech of the president has become a generic name for the President's closest 
supporters. It has a negative connotation. The suggestive power of the Ukrai-
nian phrase “lyubi druzi” is increased (through code-switching) by its use in 
Russian-language texts in order to describe such phenomena as nepotism and 
corruption around the President: “Do the events that happened in the last Con-
gress of ‘Our Ukraine’ [the President's party – L.K.] mean that the party began 
a serious process of staff renewal, a release from ‘lyubih druziv’?” (Kiev Tele-
graph, 27.10.-02.11.2006), “The remaining half [referring to the IMF loan – 
L.K.] “was assimilated” by “lyubi druzi”, with the help of their own and family 
firms and companies with ‘tenders on state purchasing’. There are legends 
about this” (2000, No. 13, 27.03.-02.04.2009).
Some political labels entered mass media discourse even in 2004, and have re-
tained their potential influence up to today. Such labels as professor, lyubi druzi, 
donetskie, nashysty, orange, pomerantsy, beekeeper, gas princess have been 
actively used all this time. These words cause a negative evaluative attitude 
towards one or another part of society (depending on who the reader supports).
The distinctive feature of Ukrainian mass media political discourse of 2004-
2010 is an appeal to the psycho-emotional sphere of the addressee, which in-
tensifies the effect of the media. The modern mass media are characterised by 
appeals to real or imagined fears on the part of the reader or viewer, com-
pounded by the high speed and continuous flow of their delivery. This ap-
proach makes it impossible to comprehend the message rationally and logi-
cally, thus emphasising emotional perception. Constant appeal to the same 
fears, due to the repetition of the corresponding verbal labels, convince the re-
cipient of the reality imposed on him or her, and of the enemy image created 
by those labels.
There are several basic fears exploited by Ukrainian politicians, political strat-
egists and journalists. In the discourse of the “white-blue” opposition, the Re-
gional Party and their supporters, – they are: a) fear of nationalism (fascism): 
“nashysty” (about the members of the party “Our Ukraine”, a blend suggesting 
an analogy with the nomination “fashysty”), “orange-brown hysteria” (with 
the same analogy), “natsiki”, or ‘crawled out of caches’ (about nationalists, a 
reference to the OUN-UPA – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who had 
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been living in forest huts or “caches” in the postwar years, during the guerrilla 
war against the Soviets) and b) fear of foreign influence (e.g., pro-NATO, 
pro-US politician/President).
In the discourse of “orange” political forces the main fear actively exploited in 
times of election campaigns is the fear of criminal organisations. The verbal 
means of intensification of this fear are numerous.
Firstly, the following labels penetrated into the mass media in 2004: con, Ban-
dyukovich (a blending from “bandit” + “Yanukovich”), Donetsk bandits (his 
companions), as well as new ones which appeared during the campaign period 
of 2009-2010: “Donetsk patsanat” (“Donetsk kids” – from the slang kid – a 
member of a criminal group), “bandit territory”. They create a negative image 
not only of political opponents, but all the region's voters supporting Yanu-
kovich. The image of today's enemies is reinforced by the fear of real enemies 
of the distant past, for example in the case of the “brigade-horde mentality” of 
people from Donbass (Ukrainsky Tyzhden, 29.01.2010, No. 4), from the word 
brigade – a slangy word meaning “criminal gang”, horde – from the Tatar-Mon-
gol horde, an implication of the conquest of modern Ukraine by the Tatar-
Mongols of the historical past; “cheeky horde from the east ” [about Donbass, 
an eastern region of Ukraine – L.K.], “expropriating property and freedom” 
(Novaya Gazeta, 26.01.2010). In the latter example the fear of losing property 
and freedom is expressed.
The non-standard vocabulary of criminal slang, which has been widely and 
actively used in “orange” political media discourse from 2004 to the present 
day, appears to be the verbal component of the mass media enemy image of 
political opponents (for example mochilovo, bratki, havat’, shesterit’, briga-
dir, pahan and many other nominations relating to the criminal world). In this 
regard, I must mention an extract from newly elected President Yushchenko's 
appeal to the heads of security services and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Donetsk region, in February 2004: “Guys, either you defend your country 
to the last drop of your blood according to the oath of allegiance, or become 
brigadiers for tillages (a TV programme “Television News Service” – All 
Ukrainian TV channel “1+1”, 10.02.2005)”. This statement conveys the pre-
supposition “law enforcement officials in the Donetsk region are criminals 
because they speak criminal slang ”. This interpretation is quite predictable. 
Manipulative impact is on the subconscious level without any rational and 
logical thinking.
Verbal aggression, explicitly conveyed by expressive-emotive words with 
negative evaluation, and the intensification of fear that results, have become a 
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hallmark of political discourse in the Ukrainian mass media, especially in the 
last three weeks between the first and the second rounds of the presidential 
election in Ukraine in 2010: “hordes of Yanucovich are frankly hack, and those 
who still do not understand, who are not aware of the risk in the situation, will 
likely give them all that is available in the near future. And won't utter a 
word.” (“Remember the heroes of Kruty – stop the aggressive horde of Yanu-
covich” – www.rupor.info, 29.01.2010). And these are not isolated examples. 
Thus, the newspaper Svoboda referring to the will of the citizens from the 
south-east of the country, disparagingly called the result of the first round of 
voting in the presidential election of 2010 “the maloros uprising ” (uprising 
of the Ukrainians). And further: “It appears that the current elections are the 
first act of the Ukranian Punch and Judy show, a mass spectacle demonstrating 
to the world an unbreakable inferiority complex and historically perverted 
ideas.” (Svoboda, 02.02.2010), etc.
Expressive terms such as malorosy (Little Russians, referring to the Ukraini-
ans, whichin the “orange” discourse has a negative evaluation), vertep (den), 
puppet show, inferiority complex, perverted form a very negative image of 
the ‘other’, referring to all voters from the south-east of Ukraine.
Another distinctive feature of the mass media political discourse of recent years 
in comparison with the 2004 election campaign is a wider usage of implication, 
which is known to possess greater attraction, because it assumes the recipient's 
participation in creating the message by extracting the hidden information. In-
terpreting the message in the manner intended by the writer or speaker, the ad-
dressee accepts the necessary information without seeking confirmation of its 
validity. This is how implication works. So, after the first round of the 2010 
presidential election, one candidate for the presidency asked voters who voted 
in the first round “for other candidates of the democratic forces”: “I am con-
vinced that when you voted for new changes, when you voted for new people, 
for new leaders you did not intend to bring criminals to power” (Koms. Prav-
da in Ukraine, 22.-28.02.2010); “I am sure that people who voted for all can-
didates from the democratic forces: Tigipko, Yatsenyuk, Suprun, Kostenko, – 
do not intend the country to be led by criminals” (Facty, 21.01.2010).
In these statements there are no explicit references to her political opponent 
with whom she came into the second round of elections, but just an opposition 
of “democratic forces”and “new changes” on the one hand, and “criminals” 
on the other. These expressions suggest that her opponent is supported by 
criminals. This reinforces a positive image of the addresser and a negative im-
age of the unnamed but well-known politician implicitly referred to. This crea-
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tion of a negative image, discrediting the opponent by means of implicit forms 
of attack, is a more subtle and effective way of achieving impact on the re-
cipient, in comparison with explicit aggression.
As is well known, political slogans are highly influential in election cam-
paigns. The most striking among them in 2004 were: “We are many – we will 
not be defeated!”, “Yushchenko – yes!”. In 2009 we had: “She works”. It ap-
peared in the period of tough confrontation in Verkhovna Rada when the Re-
gional Party deputies blocked the parliamentary rostrum in the fight for the 
adoption of the law on social standards. This prompted the appearance on ad-
vertising billboards of the slogan: “They block. She works.” Extensive discus-
sions in the media of the situation in Parliament, as well as the above-noted 
mediatization of the Ukrainian society, made a pragmatic presupposition easily 
recognisable for recipients: ‘they’ are the Regional Party; ‘she’ is Prime Min-
ister Yulia Timoshenko. The high evaluation of the prime ministeras a presi-
dential candidate is introduced in implicit form. The main purpose of the first 
part of the advertising text (“They block”) is to assign contrasting value and 
create an oppositional logical relationship. Without this polarised presentation 
of the leader and her opponents, the head of the government might be per-
ceived in much more equivocal terms, against the background of the economic 
crises, declining productivity and increasing unemployment. It also, of course, 
serves to provide a negative evaluation of her opponent. During the election 
campaign the first part of political advertising changed the informing of all af-
fairs of the Yulia Timochenko government, the second part – “she works” – re-
mained unchanged.
However, the effect of this political slogan appears to have been doubtful. The 
fact that its meaning was only implicit allowed it to be taken up in advertising 
texts, including the play on words: “She works. She is an automobile second-
hand shop” (an advertisement for a second hand car dealership); “They work. 
We dance” (advertisement for the dance club “Big Dance”); “They speak. She 
works. But I take photos ” (advertisement for a camera); “She works – you have 
a rest ” (advertisement for saunas); “She works – we repair” (advertisement 
for online computer support) and “She works!!! You have a rest” (advertise-
ment in the subway). Furthermore, in a number of Ukrainian regions billboards 
appeared with counter-advertising slogans: “She works. And robs Ukraine ”, 
“They are kaka. She is swell ” (dolly), “She works. They die. They are Ukraini-
ans” (a reference to the advertisement “She works. She is Ukraine”).
In the opposition media, the pronoun “she” was used with the denotative con-
tent “Prime Minister of Ukraine”. The substantivisation of the Ukrainian pro-
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noun which occurs with the corresponding change of its grammatical para-
digm creates a striking negative evaluative connotation in the context: “And 
besides I noticed that VONA [SHE] has blank eyes like buttons” (2000, 
01.01.2010); “And yet VONA [SHE] is struggling with the crisis and the epi-
demic” (The President is struggling with VONOY); bypass gas pipelines are 
being built (2000, 11.12.2009); “not led (or led) forces push VONU (her) at the 
same chair” (ibid); “For whom the crisis is a war, and for whom VONA (she)! 
Here is one in the country for whom there is no crisis, it is “premyerka” (Prime 
Minister) – she celebrated her own nomination with the merchant sweep!” 
(2000, 30.10.2009); “Creative directors of VONY (she) have raised the bar” 
(Segodnya,15.01.2010).
The irony and sarcasm conveyed by the nomination “VONA” (she) is supported 
graphically, and in some cases by means of other lexical expressions in one 
syntagmatic set: tsyatsya, dolly, premyerka, (used in the Western Ukraine lexi-
cal variant to “prime”). Some attempts to give the image “VONY” a positive 
evaluation were not successful, entitled: “The Great Patriotic VONA” – (Fo-
cus, No. 52 (164), 23.12.2009).
Along with the semantic transformation of the Ukrainian pronoun VONA, it is 
necessary to note the transformation of the form of the word VONA → VOiNA 
(war), entailing another change in meaning, which creates a very negative 
connotation for the image: “Stop VOiNU! [war]” (2000, 12.02.2010).
Implicit communication of ideas is used to discredit opponents by both sides 
of the political system. We can see it again in the following citation from the 
Kiyevsky Telegraph (28.04.2006): “At the same time Austria specialises in 
laundering money from Eastern European countries. Austrian financial corpo-
rations in Europe have approximately the same reputation as businessmen from 
Donetsk” This statement has the presupposition “Donetsk businessmen are 
criminals”, aimed at imposing negative evaluation. This presupposition is 
supported by explicit labels such as “Donetsk bandits”, “Donetsk bandyuki ”, 
“the dons” (clipped form of ‘Donetsk’), and “the Donetsks”, which were intro-
duced into mass media discourse in 2004 and are extensively used during all 
election campaigns.
Implicit accusations can take other forms too, including allegations of drug 
addiction, and to take an accuser to court for slander or libel is virtually im-
possible because the allegation is not expressed in the message explicitly.
One example of this is “The girl with the cannabis eyes goes along with the 
communists in the opposition” (Kiyev Telegraph, 30.06.-06.07.2006). “The 
girl with the cannabis eyes” is, in fact, the accusation against Timoshenko of 
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drug addiction, which is not mentioned explicitly in the text, but is clearly dis-
cerned by the readers. The reader will surely remember the direct accusations 
of cocaine use by Yulia Timoshenko which were made by the representative of 
the Regional Party, T. Chernovil, but later retracted.
NPs may also contain implicit information, as in “recently Lutsenko said that 
Kiev is headed by a “coke-chemical mayor ” (Segodnya, 05.11.2007), “Lenya-
space” and “austronaut” (about the mayor of Kiev, suggesting associations 
with the language of drug culture, such as “coke” for cocaine, and “spaced” 
meaning the state of drug intoxication).
Completely new for the mass media political discourse of the “post-orange” 
period is the usage of taboo words or obscene euphemisms by leaders of po-
litical parties in public discourse such as press conferencesand government 
meetings, with subsequent circulation in the media. These utterances demon-
strate the low level of culture of the speakers themselves. In September 2005 
the president announced during a video-conference with Ukraine, whilst on a 
visit to the United States, that he dismissed his prime minister and the gov-
ernment: “All must [...] clear off the beach, he claimed” (www.pravda.com.ua, 
11.09.2005). Or: “The solution is probably that everyone should clear off the 
beach” (V. Yushchenko, Vecherniye Vesti, 21.09.2005). The addresser did 
not explicitly utter a taboo word (i.e. “to say where to get off [...]”), but it was 
perceived clearly by his hearers. Similarly: “If you don't pay your partners in 
Verkhovna Rada, if they do not buy another Lexus for themselves, they will, 
if you'll pardon me, show you an asshole” (addressing the Prime Minister at 
the meeting of the Council of National Security of Ukraine, replicated in the 
mass media, Segodnya, 10.01.2009; Vlast Deneg, 2009, No. 48 and others); 
“Put this bill in front of that journalist's muzzle, and then take him to the court!” 
(V. Yushchenko about the scandal with his son, Ukrainska Pravda, 27.07.2005); 
“Mr. Osadchii is a chairman of Yushchenko's election headquarters and has 
the task of blocking the work. A muddle-headed person, stupid, blin” [i.e. 
fuck] (Yulia Timoshenko, Vikna, TV channel “STB”, 05.11.2009); “I [Viktor 
Yanukovich] declare publicly on television today that I will not support this 
asshole [mayor of Simpferopol, the representative of the Regional Party – 
L.K.]” (Sobytiya, TV channel “Ukraine”, 02.10.2009).
As we have seen here, a wide range of verbal strategies are used in the Ukrain-
ian political discourse to gain PR exposure. However, non-verbal elements are 
also widely used by the politicians. This issue requires separate consideration 
to do it full justice, but I will mention the most striking of them here. The 
leader of the party known as the ‘Yulia Timoshenko Bloc’, the only well-
known female politician in Ukraine, uses sexist strategies as a major element 
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in her influence on the electorate. She wears transparent Guipure lace blouses, 
tight-fitting dresses with low backs, dresses with zips at the back going down 
to mid-thigh level, endless ‘haute couture’ outfits, or, at the other extreme, 
white clothes suggesting purity and innocence (flirtatious hearts against a white 
background, echoing the logo of her party), and all this together with her 
Ukrainian folk-style plaited hair, creating an extremely enticing image.
Commenting on the phenomenon of Yulia Timoshenko as a politician, Dmytro 
Vydrin, a famous political scientist, said:
Elegant vulgarity and refined triteness are the ultimate political weapons of 
Yulia Tymoshenko, which are difficult to counter with any rational arguments 
or projects [...]. Actually she has brought her female form to such public per-
fection in her politics, that there is no need for any content. (Segodnya, 
27.01.2010)
Of course non-verbal images such as these correlate strategically with the 
verbal labels and slogans: Kytsya (pussy-cat), tsyatsya, the white-hearted, 
“Vote by your heart! ” and the combination is perhaps the greatest resource for 
manipulative PR-impact in the media discourse as a whole.
Thus, the mass media political discourse of the “post-Maidan” period is char-
acterised by a) a wide range of explicit and implicit forms of verbal aggres-
sion, creating an overall picture of intolerance among the participants in the 
political system; b) high levels of manipulation of the public consciousness; 
and c) a destructive influence not only on the discourse, but on Ukrainian so-
ciety in general, and, above all, on the formation of democratic values in the 
minds of the citizens of the newly independent republic.
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